Starting in Android 12, unlocking the device with a class 1
("convenience") biometric, class 2 ("weak") biometric, or a trust agent
unexpectedly doesn't allow the use of UnlockedDeviceRequired keys.  The
cause of this bug is that the cryptographic protection that Keystore now
applies to UnlockedDeviceRequired keys incorrectly assumes that the
device can only be unlocked using LSKF or via a biometric that
participates in Keystore (has a SID and uses HardwareAuthTokens).
Actually, Keyguard also allows the device to be unlocked using weaker
biometrics that do not particiate in Keystore, if they are enrolled.
Similarly, there are also cases where a trust agent can actively unlock
the device, e.g. unlocking a phone using a paired watch.

In combination with the Keystore changes in
I1b0d9ec4f9e31dc91642e865045766bd17e34cad, this CL fixes the bug by
making Keystore retain the UnlockedDeviceRequired super keys in memory
if a weak unlock method is enabled at device lock time.  This does mean
that UnlockedDeviceRequired is enforced only logically when a weak
unlock method is enabled, but this is the best we can do in this case.

Note: a future CL will take into account the progressive expiration of
unlock methods while the device is locked and upgrade the security of
UnlockedDeviceRequired accordingly.  The present CL focuses just on
choosing the correct protection at lock time, fixing a user-visible bug.

Test: Ran the following automated tests with and without the
      fix_unlocked_device_required_keys_v2 flag enabled:
          atest com.android.server.locksettings \
          && atest TrustManagerServiceTest \
          && atest TrustTests \
          && atest -p --include-subdirs system/security/keystore2 \
          && atest CtsKeystoreTestCases

Test: Manually tested each combination of biometric setup: none,
      fingerprint, face, and fingerprint+face.  Locked the device, then
      verified via logcat that Keystore protected the
      UnlockedDeviceRequired keys in the expected way, then verified
      that UnlockedDeviceRequired keys cannot be used (even in the case
      where the super keys were not protected).  Unlocked device using
      weakest method available, then verified that
      UnlockedDeviceRequired keys can be used.  To check whether
      UnlockedDeviceRequired keys can be used or not, used the CTS
      method mentioned in the Test of https://r.android.com/2878769.

      Also, enabled Extend Unlock with a bluetooth device, and verified
      that it's not counted as an unlock method.

      Also, verified that if Lockdown mode is triggered, the
      UnlockedDeviceRequired keys are fully protected.

Bug: 296464083
Change-Id: I34dc49f1338e94755e96c1cf84de0638dc70d311

This reverts commit 468c8fe6.
Additionally, this adds a guard for reading the flag: If
the calling app does not have the right permission to read the device
configuration, the code will assume it is not set.

Reason for revert: Fixed flag reading code

Bug: 314744703
Test: atest CtsWebkitTestCases:android.webkit.cts.WebViewSslTest#testProceedClientCertRequestKeyWithAndroidKeystoreKey
Change-Id: I29c58bc8c5960c0ab9af70f93440bd9a1db12dc7

Currently Keystore is notified of the device being unlocked and locked
for each user via onLockScreenEvent(lockScreenEvent, userId, password,
unlockingSids), where lockScreenEvent is UNLOCK or LOCK.  This is a bit
confusing because the password parameter is only meaningful for UNLOCK,
and the unlockingSids parameter is only meaningful for LOCK.  This
problem will get worse when we add a parameter that tells Keystore
whether unlocking via a weak biometric or trust agent is possible, as
that will be another parameter that is only meaningful for LOCK.

Therefore, this CL splits onLockScreenEvent into two methods
onDeviceUnlocked and onDeviceLocked, each with the appropriate
parameters.  No actual change in behavior intended.  This change does
make TrustManagerService no longer call getBiometricSids() for unlocks,
so technically that is a slight difference; however, for UNLOCK events
Keystore ignored the SID list, so this just eliminates unnecessary work.

Bug: 296464083
Test: atest -p --include-subdirs system/security/keystore2 \
      && atest CtsKeystoreTestCases \
      && atest TrustTests \
      && atest com.android.server.locksettings
Flag: N/A, straightforward refactoring
Change-Id: Ibfaa22ba27d13248c9c4c69a4d2efb2231792c31

This reverts commit e0c8ad86.

Reason for revert: 314140771

Change-Id: Ied1f3042aee8ac8642237a4cdcfa75be7a02e7e8

In case the MGF1 Digest setter flag is turned off (that is, it is not
possible to specify MGF1 Digests using the new API introduced), then the
old behaviour has to take place.

The old behaviour was to set all primary digests specified, as MGF1 Digests.
This behaviour has been added when the flag isn't set.

Bug: 308378912
Bug: 308069562
Test: atest CtsKeystoreTestCases:android.keystore.cts.CipherTest#testKatBasicWithDifferentProviders CtsKeystoreWycheproofTestCases:RsaOaepTest
Change-Id: I5d4541ce952e1bad7c8fdd55a00176274b0b66f3

When the keystore service is not available or
not initialized we do not want to crash the service.
So we throw and Exception that KeystoreService
is not availble when it should be possibly in an
incorrect state.

Test: atest CtsKeystoreTestCases
Bug: 304758094
Change-Id: If73856deb27b9f11a9b77f0ba32c3b4037332759

The MGF1 Digest setter should not accept a null vararg. It should not
take in null at all.

Bug: 302280420
Test: m
Change-Id: I9db395d09e2fd0e609cd9019f3d3aedbb3244ef3

The security improvements to Keystore's UnlockedDeviceRequired key
protection in Android 12 regressed its behavior by making it no longer
work for unsecured users, e.g. users with a Swipe lock screen.  One of
the things that broke it is that Keystore started superencrypting
UnlockedDeviceRequired keys, yet Keystore unnecessarily ties
superencryption to the existence of the user's LSKF.  That is, Keystore
creates a user's super keys only when an LSKF is set, and Keystore
deletes all super keys and superencrypted keys when the LSKF is removed.

To fix this, we're first making each user's Keystore super keys have the
same lifetime as the user's synthetic password (and always be encrypted
by it), which is very similar to how the CE storage key works starting
in Android 14.  Second, when a user's LSKF is removed, we're making
Keystore delete *only* the user's auth-bound keys.

This change implements the LockSettingsService side of the fix.  This
includes the following parts:

- When initializing a user's synthetic password, LockSettingsService now
  initializes the user's Keystore super keys.

- When upgrading to a build including this fix, LockSettingsService now
  does a one-time migration where it initializes the super keys for
  unsecured users.  This is necessary to handle existing users.

- When removing a user's LSKF, LockSettingsService now calls the new
  onUserLskfRemoved method of Keystore to delete auth-bound keys only.

- Finally, when an unsecured user's CE storage is unlocked,
  LockSettingsService now unlocks the user's Keystore super keys too.

Due to trunk-stable, these changes are actually behind a flag for now.

Bug: 296464083
Test: see If12824369fbad4a90e5cd0427e792655fd233b96
Change-Id: Ib92a439c2c27cef54c28189dfb5beef68756528e

KeyMint handles challenges up to 128 bytes. Document this in the
KeyGenParameterSpec Builder.

Bug: 307714384
Test: m
Change-Id: Ib2082edd12828649225c42de56e176540e997467

This obtains the time (via SystemClock.elapsedRealtime()) when the
user last authenticated using any of the passed authenticators.

Test: manual, atest AuthServiceTest, CTS
Bug: 303839446
Change-Id: Id22bee7b05271ce38816f932b3696cb450ab025d

Remove AndroidKeyStoreMaintenance#getState() and both overloads of
KeyStore#state().  None of these are used by platform code anymore.

The two KeyStore#state() methods do have @UnsupportedAppUsage, as do two
values of the State enum: UNLOCKED and LOCKED.  However, there is a
clear public API equivalent for apps that may be checking these states:
UserManager#isUserUnlocked().  Therefore, according to the policy on
unsupported usage of internal APIs, we can remove these internal APIs.

Also, the non-SDK dashboard has no runtime results for either method,
and only one static analysis result which is from unused code in one
app.  This is consistent with these methods being entirely unused.

Part of the motivation for removing these internal APIs is that upcoming
changes to the lifetime of keystore superencryption keys would change
the behavior of getState.  So it seems like a good time to remove this
unused/unsupported code instead of wasting time maintaining it.

Bug: 296464083
Test: atest -p --include-subdirs system/security/keystore2
Change-Id: Iff821bbdeac5ee0653c9c71867fd53d38cb4d48f

Test: m
Change-Id: I4a9fe5ff53ce3a7eaf02011df2d19b17111b7b8b

Test: N/A
Change-Id: I1154d866611a744a34631a9bc129419b1e9f99e6

Making changes to use aidl_interface build system in
KeyAttestationApplicationProvider to support Rust, CPP and Java
backends.
Defined AAID interface and its parcelables using AIDL types.
Removed custom parcelables defined for AAID.

Bug: 267452060
Test: atest android.keystore.cts.KeyAttestationTest
Change-Id: Iec558642867c13e2998d7f69f00b3f1adf4e2b62

Android 13 / T / API 33 introduced a new class in Crypto Object
in the Android Framework. This allows auth-per-op for ECDH
keys.

Bug: 282058146
Test: atest FrameworksCoreTests
API-Coverage-Bug: 282058146
Change-Id: I17877fed90ae0b3894b28967c28786a091557dd2

Add a separate setter for the digests used by the MGF1 mask generation
function (for RSA OAEP operations).

Previously the MGF1 digests were specified according to the primary
digests specification, which is not accurate enough.

With the new setter:
* If the user does not explicitly specify MGF1 digests, then the
  default (SHA-1) will be specified in the tag passed to Keystore.
* If the user does explicitly specify MGF1 digests, only those
  digests will be specified in the tag passed to Keystore.
  The SHA-1 digest will not be added.

Bug: 284140060
Test: atest android.security.keystore.KeyGenParameterSpecTest android.security.ParcelableKeyGenParameterSpecTest
Test: atest CtsKeystoreTestCases:android.keystore.cts.CipherTest#testKatBasicWithDifferentProviders
Change-Id: I1521e9b4399ece33c2d17b79133543d490d3b377

Test: m
Change-Id: I9a0c7b5e912b882a1815afb1eddc02f7cb7872c5

This has strictmode annotations for when calls are
made into Keystore DB to make reads or writes.

Test: atest CtsKeystoreTestCases
Bug: 180135124
Change-Id: I819e1c63875a4af16a6fbe991a9f7c9c95ea8e6a

See https://source.android.com/setup/contribute/respectful-code for reference

For this round, the fixes are only applied to the following to minimize breaking dependencies:
  * comments (excluding javaDoc annotations)
	* private constants
	* private functions
	* parameters within functions

BYPASS_INCLUSIVE_LANGUAGE_REASON=Just updating a few select inclusive language violations.
No-Typo-Check: Changes focused on inclusive language violations.
BUG: 295342157
Change-Id: I70dcadc67c13c34edda553897847249e92c26239

Deduplicate the addition of the SIDs and USER_AUTH_TYPE, and consolidate
the handling of isUserAuthenticationValidWhileOnBody() into one place.
No change in behavior.

Test: atest KeystoreTests
Change-Id: Ic57e3506a62d90ee0fd7b5860d4cda44aa1b5acf

- Make core/java/android/security/keystore/OWNERS include
  keystore/OWNERS instead of duplicating it

- Make core/tests/coretests/src/android/security/keystore/ owned by
  keystore/OWNERS instead of no one

- Make core/java/android/security/Confirmation*.java owned by
  keystore/OWNERS instead of an individual person

- Remove core/java/android/security/keystore/recovery/OWNERS, as it was
  redundant with OWNERS of its parent directory

- Remove Xoogler jdanis@

Change-Id: I64c1c624dcc92fbf20a6d4fb667cf47240edf4d5

SecureKeyImport is failed because of MGF_DIGEST tag mismatch.
wrapping key has MGF_DIGEST tag when generate or import key
but importWrappedKey logic does not have MGF_DIGEST tag on WrappedKeyEntry
So MGF_DIGEST tat mismatch error occur when decrypt wrapped key using wrapping key

Insert SHA-1 value on MGF_DIGEST tag because ImportWrappedKey should have spcified format
that keymint is compulsorily checking main digest SHA-256 and MGF digest SHA-1.

And MGF_DIGEST tag will add only wrappingkey has MGF_DIGEST value
in order not to affect keys generated prior to Android14.

Bug: 277853193
Test: android.keystore.cts.ImportWrappedKeyTest#testKeyStore_ImportWrappedKey
Change-Id: Id7229a763e3041ffbe73989a2bb24306b7beb7a5
Signed-off-by: Jaeyoon Lee <joyful.lee@samsung.corp-partner.google.com>

This reverts commit dde5ebaa.

Reason for revert: Will re-introduce http://b/278157584

Even though KeyMint v2 supports the MGF_DIGEST tag, it does not include it in the key characteristics. This would not be a problem for keys generated on an Android U device with KeyMint v2 but it will be a problem on a device that was upgraded to Android U where keys were generated before the upgrade (so the MGF_DIGEST tag was not added).
Because we have no way of knowing if the MGF_DIGEST tag was specified when the key was created on KeyMint implementations older than v3, we should not add the tag on begin().

Change-Id: I7b34799b95eb2ff054ec4d090ccbd93e6442dcfe

Mixed build of Android T + U GSI misses to add RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST in
key begin operation parameters and hence RSA cipher operation fails.
This was due to Keymint 200 implementation in Android T supported
RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST tag but did not included into key characteristics and
the check in AndroidKeyStoreRSACipherSpi fails on Android T + U GSI
builds.

To fix this issue additional condition added to check if key
characteristics do not have RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST tag but the KeyMint
version is 200 then it has to include in operation parameters.

Bug: 289859292
Bug: 289749312
Bug: 287891167
Bug: 287532460
Test: atest  CtsKeystoreWycheproofTestCases:com.google.security.wycheproof.RsaOaepTest
Test: atest CtsKeystoreTestCases:android.keystore.cts.CipherTest#testKatBasicWithDifferentProviders
(cherry picked from https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:d8b18413ade6ba13817caae52abdffc609a92d89)
Merged-In: I13ca50a45e733276d1451d17904780eff86bf296
Change-Id: I13ca50a45e733276d1451d17904780eff86bf296

When a key requires user authentication and one of the authentication
methods permitted is the device's screen lock credentials, the
root SID is added as an authenticator, and change of biometrics
enrollment will not invalidate the key.

Bug: 275900161
Test: m docs
Change-Id: I180f28883a5ac62e8bfa0b0596396085ff676637

If a key does not have the MGF_DIGEST tag in its key characteristics,
do not include the MGF_DIGEST tag for it (even if the algorithm string
specifies it).

This fixes an issue with keys that were generated on Android 13, where
the MGF_DIGEST tag was not propagated from the SPI layer. Such keys will
not have the MGF_DIGEST tag and so it will not be added by the SPI layer
even if the algorithm string specifies it. This maintains Android 13's
(incorrect) behaviour of ignoring the MGF Digest specification, but is
necessary to use those keys (otherwise KeyMint will error out
on begin() due to an incompatible MGF digest specification).

Bug: 278157584
Test: atest CtsKeystoreWycheproofTestCases:com.google.security.wycheproof.RsaOaepTest
Merged-In: I0f1fa7983f9c771bec3196c6a617eb7044ac2e79
Change-Id: I6a4c15ca04aa78c2191d47394811ba9338ee7f0b

If a key does not have the MGF_DIGEST tag in its key characteristics,
do not include the MGF_DIGEST tag for it (even if the algorithm string
specifies it).

This fixes an issue with keys that were generated on Android 13, where
the MGF_DIGEST tag was not propagated from the SPI layer. Such keys will
not have the MGF_DIGEST tag and so it will not be added by the SPI layer
even if the algorithm string specifies it. This maintains Android 13's
(incorrect) behaviour of ignoring the MGF Digest specification, but is
necessary to use those keys (otherwise KeyMint will error out
on begin() due to an incompatible MGF digest specification).

Bug: 278157584
Test: atest CtsKeystoreWycheproofTestCases:com.google.security.wycheproof.RsaOaepTest
(cherry picked from https://android-review.googlesource.com/q/commit:05d046390769a8ba6f113ea6b191d9addf183627)
Merged-In: I0f1fa7983f9c771bec3196c6a617eb7044ac2e79
Change-Id: I0f1fa7983f9c771bec3196c6a617eb7044ac2e79

All error codes defined in ErrorCode.aidl file are expected to be
mapped in KeymasterDefs.java file, excluding -62 which is handled by
Keystore and not required to define on Jaya layer.
So missing error codes from KeymasterDefs are added and also categorized
in KeyStoreException class.

Bug: 206432492
Test: atest CtsKeystoreTestCases:android.keystore.cts.KeyStoreExceptionTest
Change-Id: I9df69e03379d0437457037e16de76feb27ea8aaf

If a key does not have the MGF_DIGEST tag in its key characteristics,
do not include the MGF_DIGEST tag for it (even if the algorithm string
specifies it).

This fixes an issue with keys that were generated on Android 13, where
the MGF_DIGEST tag was not propagated from the SPI layer. Such keys will
not have the MGF_DIGEST tag and so it will not be added by the SPI layer
even if the algorithm string specifies it. This maintains Android 13's
(incorrect) behaviour of ignoring the MGF Digest specification, but is
necessary to use those keys (otherwise KeyMint will error out
on begin() due to an incompatible MGF digest specification).

Bug: 278157584
Test: atest CtsKeystoreWycheproofTestCases:com.google.security.wycheproof.RsaOaepTest
Change-Id: I0f1fa7983f9c771bec3196c6a617eb7044ac2e79

Bug: 272704160
Test: com.android.server.locksettings
      com.android.cts.devicepolicy.QuietModeHostsideTest
      KeyGenParameterSpecTest
      Manual
Change-Id: I620cc4455ca0f7a8508f12b7550039200b42b8e8

With the move to rkpd, we no longer need to make calls from framework
into the remote provisioner to tell it that a key was consumed.

Bug: 274823784
Test: atest KeystoreTests
Test: atest CtsKeystoreTestCases:android.keystore.cts.KeyAttestationTest
Change-Id: I510d471a980c62e5798e459729f73c231321d2a9

Change interaction with Keystore2 in the following manner:
* Return an enumerator over the entries in Keystore2 rather than
  attempting to get all of them into one single data structure.
* Use a new Keystore2 method for getting the count of entries
  rather than count the size of the array returned.

The enumerator reads a batch of key descriptors from Keystore2.
Once the batch has been exhausted, the enumerator added asks
Keystore2 for the next batch of keys starting with the last
alias it has processed, until it receives an empty array.

Bug: 222287335
Test: atest KeystoreTests
Change-Id: I309b3188df998825557a3c5e6d777b1c0807a924

The latter might be initialized in the Zygote and return the same
sequence within app restarts.

Bug: 273524418
Fix: 273524418
Test: m
Change-Id: Id85082edffb7b769bb5f78d66b561e5e097227c5

Device ID attestation was failing in AOSP and GSI images due to
properties mismatch in Build.java and actual device properties.
(For example, the value of Build.DEVICE on a Raven device running
an AOSP build would be 'aosp_raven', but KeyMint was provisioned
with the value 'raven'.)

To fix above issue, properties ro.product.*_for_attestation were
introduced in AOSP build files (eg. aosp_raven.mk) only. But this
was not sufficient for both AOSP and GSI. The same solution does
not work for GSI images: GSI images are generic and so we cannot
set device-specific properties in them.

So, if ro.product.*_for_attestation properties are empty or unknown,
they are read from ro.product.vendor because these values are not
changed after flashing GSI images also. This fix will work for
both AOSP and GSI images. Device ID properties preferences for
eg. Build.BRAND_FOR_ATTESTATION = ro.product.brand_for_attestation ->
ro.product.vendor.brand -> UNKNOWN.

Bug: 268294752
Bug: 110779648
Bug: 259376922
Test: atest VtsAidlKeyMintTargetTest:PerInstance/NewKeyGenerationTest#EcdsaAttestationIdTags/0_android_hardware_security_keymint_IKeyMintDevice_default
Test: atest VtsAidlKeyMintTargetTest:PerInstance/NewKeyGenerationTest#EcdsaAttestationIdTags/1_android_hardware_security_keymint_IKeyMintDevice_strongbox
Test: atest CtsKeystoreTestCases:android.keystore.cts.KeyAttestationTest CtsKeystoreTestCases:DeviceOwnerKeyManagementTest
Change-Id: I574eca430cd2022cb9c270ca23ad33f6e5423cd4

After adding attestation properties for AOSP/GSI builds their comparison
in Spi layer missed one condition. If these values were not set they were assigned
as Build.UNKNOWN. Hence additional check is added in Spi layer.

Bug: 267643193
Test: atest CtsKeystoreTestCases:android.keystore.cts.KeyAttestationTest CtsKeystoreTestCases:DeviceOwnerKeyManagementTest
Change-Id: I5b3ef0a308bbb12bc4cac2efcf04468f65db1ef8

This is the first in a set of changes that get RKP error data directly
from keystore.

Starting with Android U, we get detailed RKP error information directly
in the ResponseCode from keystore. This means mRkpStatus and related
logic can be removed after AOSP fully switches over to using rkpd
from the old RemoteProvisioner.

Test: RkpdAppUnitTests
Bug: 264888027
Change-Id: I32e128cca51b2d7dfdd67824ecb100f4e1cd4341

Handle the case where a KeyMint implementation produced an invalid
X.509 certificate that is the container for the generated key's public
portion.

There's not much for the caller to do other than re-generate the key.

Bug: 261788762
Test: Not tested yet.
Change-Id: Ia883df4f5e29a7d75929d37a68b015e857b90560

Alternet device properties used for attestation on AOSP and GSI builds.
Attestation ids were different in AOSP/GSI builds than provisioned ids
in keymint. Hence additional properties used to make these ids identical
to provisioned ids.

Bug: 110779648
Bug: 259376922
Test: atest VtsAidlKeyMintTargetTest:PerInstance/NewKeyGenerationTest#EcdsaAttestationIdTags/0_android_hardware_security_keymint_IKeyMintDevice_default
Test: atest VtsAidlKeyMintTargetTest:PerInstance/NewKeyGenerationTest#EcdsaAttestationIdTags/1_android_hardware_security_keymint_IKeyMintDevice_strongbox
Test: atest CtsKeystoreTestCases:android.keystore.cts.KeyAttestationTest CtsKeystoreTestCases:DeviceOwnerKeyManagementTest

Change-Id: Idd87314b8e5a95de3daac0ea4ff4dffd4c4c6f63

We are adding the error codes ERROR_DEVICE_UNREGISTERED and
ERROR_DEVICE_POTENTIALLY_VULNERABLE to reflect the new changes
described in go/surface-rkp-status.

Test: Unit test and Cts test added to KeystoreExceptionTest and run using atest CtsKeystoreTestCases
Change-Id: Ie93814aaa5422e323d5a643e10e9fe4a51c07560

To support attestation of a second IMEI, when ID attestation (with IMEI)
is requested, pass in the 2nd IMEI as a SECOND_IMEI KeyMint tag.

Bug: 244732345
Test: atest android.keystore.cts.DeviceOwnerKeyManagementTest
Change-Id: I19a3733746fa6a35c6225f0c60fd9f4b51a62ab1